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Abstract 
 
Can governments contract out the management of schools to private operators at 
scale? This paper estimates the effect of a school reform in Punjab, Pakistan, in 
which 4,276 poorly performing public primary schools (around 10 percent of the 
total) were contracted out to private operators in a single school year.  These 
schools remain free to students and the private operator receives a per-student 
subsidy equivalent to less than half of spending in government schools. Using a 
difference-in-difference framework we estimate that enrolment in converted 
schools increased by over 60 percent. Converted schools see a slight decline in 
overall average test scores, but this may be a composition effect rather than a 
treatment effect. Schools with the same number or fewer students as in the 
previous year saw no change in average test scores.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The number of children attending private schools in low and middle-income 
countries more than doubled between 2000 and 2015, growing at around 5 percent 
per year (compared to growth of 0.2 percent per year in government schools). 
Though private schools may offer some benefits over government schools, they are 
typically inaccessible to the poorest households due to higher fees. Many 
governments have responded by experimenting with different forms of public 
financing for privately operated schools. 
 
Can public-private partnerships provide equitable access to cost-effective private 
schools, and if so what types of arrangements are most effective? In advanced 
economies, evidence increasingly suggests that charter schools are a more promising 
form of market-orientated school reform than vouchers (Epple et al., 2017) (Epple et 
al., 2016). Evidence from developing countries is more positive on vouchers and 
subsidies for private schools (Aslam et al., 2017) (Shakeel et al., 2016), but given the 
limited number of studies it is not yet possible to make a clear distinction between 
the effectiveness of different types of model. As yet there is no rigorous study on a 
large scale Charter-style public school management programme in a low or middle-
income country, in which contexts the capacity of the state to manage effective 
procurement and regulation are likely to be particularly low. One study looks at the 
Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) pilot which involved 93 schools in its first year, 
with a randomized evaluation finding strong impacts on learning, but with high and 
potentially unsustainable costs, and from a sample of schools that were relatively 
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easier to access than the average school in the country (Romero et al., 2017). Two 
other studies have looked at the Colombia Colegios en Concesión (CEC) programme 
that involved 25 schools, suggesting that these schools outperform traditional public 
schools in test scores, driven by a longer school day (Bonilla-Angel, 2011) (Termes et 
al., 2015). Another looks at the Pakistan ‘Adopt a School’ programme with around 
1,000 schools in Punjab and 500 schools in Sindh but presents only descriptive 
analysis without making claims for causal inference (Malik et al 2015). In higher 
income countries, there is a wider literature on similar programmes, which have 
grown to around 7,000 charter schools in the US over 26 years (Epple et al., 2016), 
and around 5,000 academies in the UK over 16 years (Eyles et al., 2017).  
 
In this study we provide the first causal estimates of the effect of the Punjab Public 
School Support Programme (PSSP), which involved the largest ever number of public 
schools being contracted out to private management in a single year - 4,276 schools. 
We estimate the causal effect of school conversion on enrolment using a difference-
in-difference estimator, comparing early converters to later converters. We find a 
large increase in enrolment, concentrated in Katchi (Kindergarten). Overall there is a 
decline in exam scores in converting schools, though we present some evidence that 
this may be driven by the entry of new lower performing students. For schools that 
entered the same or fewer exam candidates than in the previous year, there was no 
change in test scores. 
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2. Pakistan context 
 
Like many low and middle-income countries around the world, Pakistan faces a 
learning crisis. 43 percent of Grade 3 children in rural Punjab are unable to read a 
simple sentence in Urdu aimed at Grade 2 students (ASER Pakistan, 2017). 73 
percent of primary age children (aged 6-10 years old) are in school, with a further 11 
percent in pre-primary and 16 percent never having attended any kind of school1. 
 
Private schooling began to expand in Pakistan in the 1990s – the share of private 
schooling in total enrolment doubled from 15 to 30 percent between 1991 and 2001. 
Private school teachers are more likely to be female, lower paid than government 
teachers, and with less security of tenure (Andrabi et al., 2008). Pakistan also has a 
long history of government engagement with the non-state sector in education. The 
federal education policy of 1972 declared “education will be made free and universal 
up to Class X [10] for all children throughout the country ... in both Government and 
privately-managed schools. Private schools will be suitably supported for the loss of 
fees incurred by them” (Bengali, 1999). This position was repeated in 1992 when a 
new policy “declared the State's intent for emphasizing the private sector's role in 
education through “viable partnership[s]” … and reiterated strongly in 2001: 
“Acknowledging the shift in government's role from being a provider to a facilitator 
[…] it is vital to rethink the parameters of public private partnership in the provision 
of education” (Malik et al., 2015). 
 																																																								
1 Pakistan Social And Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2014-15 
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Most Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Pakistan have been either subsidies for 
private schools to enable them to accept more pupils, or vouchers targeted at 
students to enable them to attend private schools. More recently provincial 
governments have begun to explore ‘contract management’ PPPs akin to US Charter 
and UK academy schools, in which private organisations are contracted to take over 
the management and operations of existing public schools, which remain 
government owned, financed, and regulated. 
 
Figure 1: Private school participation rate age 6–10, 1998-2011 
 
Source: (Nguyen and Raju, 2014) 
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Table 1: Enrolment by Class, Children Aged 6-10, Punjab 
 Government  Non-State Total Percentage 
Never attended   1,926  0.16 
Less than 1 626 671 1,297 0.11 
Class 1 1,541 1,258 2,799 0.23 
Class 2 1,311 1,014 2,324 0.19 
Class 3 941 804 1,745 0.14 
Class 4 602 499 1,100 0.09 
Class 5 313 326 639 0.05 
Class 1 - 5 4,707 3,901 8,608 0.71 
Class 6 + 130 128 258 0.02 
Total   12,088 1 
Data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2014-15 
 
Education PPPs in Punjab are managed by the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), 
itself a quasi-independent body. PEF was established in 1991, and made 
autonomous in 2004. PEF has three main programmes of support for private schools, 
all of which have grown over the past decade. The largest programme is the 
Foundation Assisted Schools, through which 1.8 million children are educated in 
registered private schools, with fees paid by PEF. The Education Voucher Scheme 
supports 400,000 children. PEF also has a New School Programme, which has 
contracted private organisations to build around 2,000 schools in remote and under-
served areas, which have enrolled 200,000 students.  
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Figure 2: Trends in PEF-supported Schools 
 
 
All data from Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) Annual Reports. Real spending is calculated using 
World Bank Consumer Price Inflation.  
 
Several papers have estimated the effects of subsidies and voucher programmes on 
test scores, generally finding positive effects on both enrolment and learning 
outcomes (Kim et al., 1999) (Alderman et al., 2003), (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2013) 
(Barrera-Osorio and Raju, 2015) (Andrabi et al., 2016) (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2017). 
One study looks at the smaller Contract School programme in Punjab and Sindh 
covering 1,500 schools (Malik et al 2015). Ours is the first study to estimate the 
causal effect of the PSSP programme, which has transferred 10 percent of 
government primary schools in the province to private management in its first year.  
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Table 2: Literature on Public-Private Partnerships in Pakistan 
Author Date Province PPP Type Outcome 
Type 
Outcome Study Type 
Alderman et al 2003 Balochistan Subsidy Enrolment Positive RCT 
Amjad & Macleod 2014 National Subsidy & 
Voucher 
Learning Positive OLS 
Andrabi et al  2016 Punjab Subsidy Learning Positive RCT 
Barrera-Osorio et 
al 
2013 Sindh Subsidy Learning Positive 
(0.16 SD) 
RCT 
Barrera-Osorio and 
Raju 
2015 Punjab Subsidy Enrolment Positive RD 
Kim et al  1999 Balochistan Subsidy Enrolment Positive RCT 
Malik et al  2015 Punjab & 
Sindh 
Contract 
Schools 
Learning Positive PSM 
 
The Public School Support Programme (PSSP) 
 
The province of Punjab is the largest of the four provinces in Pakistan, with a 
population of 110 million people. Education policy is substantially decentralized from 
the federal government to the provincial governments. In December 2015 the 
Punjab government announced that around 5,000 failing government schools (10 
percent of all primary schools in the province) would be transferred to private 
operators, as part of the Public School Support Programme (PSSP). Phase 1 began at 
the start of the school year in April 2016, with Phase 2 beginning after the summer 
break in August 2016, and Phase 3 beginning at the start of the next school year in 
April 2017. So far 4,276 schools with around 400,000 students have been 
transferred. Schools were tendered competitively, with eligibility criteria laid out for 
two categories of bidders – organisations (non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and existing school operators), and individuals. Government received 19,000 
applications for the first phase of 1,000 schools. Organisations, particularly those 
with experience running schools, were prioritized in the bidding process over 
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individuals. There are now around 2,600 schools contracted to organisations (with 
each having at least ten schools) and 1,700 schools contracted to individuals. 
Organisations are paid 700 Pakistani Rupees per child per month, and individual 
operators 550 Rupees2. This is equivalent to less than half of government per pupil 
spending in public schools (1,507 Rupees per pupil per month)3. Students may enter 
Katchi (Kindergarten) at age four. Each PSSP school has a 2-year contract with PEF, 
with renewal subject to adequate performance on ‘Quality Assurance Tests’ (QATs). 
PSSP schools are spread across the province, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Map of Treatment and Control Schools 
 
Note: We refer here to phase 1 schools as “treatment” and phase 3 as “control”. 																																																								
2 550 Rupees is the same amount provided to private schools through the Foundation Assisted 
Schools (FAS) programme (reaching 1.8 million students), and the Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) 
(reaching 0.5 million students). 
3 Institute of Social and Policy Sciences report on Public Financing of Education in Pakistan 2010-11 to 
2016-17. 
Control (1903)
Treatment (922)
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On paper PSSP schools are not allowed to charge fees, make profit, or select their 
students. They are allowed to hire their own teachers and head teachers, at market 
salaries (which are typically less than half of government teacher salaries). Existing 
government teachers were given the option of being transferred to other 
government schools. PSSP schools teach the regular curriculum, and their students 
sit both the Grade 5 exams administered to students in both public and private 
schools by the Punjab Examinations Commission (PEC), as well as the Quality 
Assurance Test (QAT) exams administered to PEF-partnering private schools for all 
grades. PSSP schools must meet minimum standards in the QAT for continued 
participation in the programme, and may be eligible for financial bonuses for good 
performance. The Punjab government School Education Department (SED) maintains 
ownership of school buildings, and responsibility for maintenance of facilities. PSSP 
school operators are required to submit quarterly expenditure statements detailing 
how income from government was spent. Payments are made monthly to school 
bank accounts. For the first six months schools are due a fixed amount regardless of 
enrolment – after this period they are due a variable amount based on the number 
of enrolled students (regardless of grade). Schools continue to teach in the existing 
medium of instruction, using textbooks provided by the Schools Education 
Department (SED) or PEF. Students wear the same uniforms as worn in government 
schools. 
 
Schools were eligible to be selected into the programme if they fulfilled any one of a 
set of five criteria primarily around enrolment and learning outcomes - being either 
overcrowded, under-utilised, with low enrolment, low standardized passing rates, or 
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being fully non-functional. Overall 10,664 schools fulfilled one of these criteria, 
leaving a large number of schools that may still be selected into any future Phase 4. 
Schools were recommended for transfer by Executive District Officers (EDOs) for 
education. The process for selection of schools by EDOs within each category is 
unclear.  
 
Table 3: PSSP Selection Criteria 
Criteria Definition 
Schools 
selected 
(Phase 1 – 3) 
All Eligible 
Schools in 
Punjab 
% 
Selected 
1. Multi grade & 
over crowded 
1 teacher, requires additional classrooms, & 
enrolment above 80   
103 943 11% 
2. Under utilized 2 or more teachers & enrolment below 30 430 1,464 29% 
3. Low enrolment Grade 1-5 enrolment below 21   1,504 5,320 28% 
4. Poor learning 
outcomes 
0% PEC passing rate (Phase I handover) or 
Less than 25% PEC passing rate (Phase II 
handover) 
872 1,317 66% 
5. Non-functional 
& closed 
Non-operational  / Merged   520 1,620 32% 
Total  3,429 10,664 32% 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
Methodology 
 
Our key challenge in estimating the causal effect of school conversion is finding an 
appropriate counterfactual. As schools were selected for PSSP based on low 
enrolment and exam scores, they are not comparable to non-PSSP schools. 
 
We use a standard difference-in-difference strategy similar to that used by 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2016) and (Eyles et al., 2017) in the context of US Charter 
school and UK Academy converters, respectively, comparing the change in outcomes 
for early converting schools with the change in outcomes for slightly later 
converters. We treat schools converted in Phase 1 as treatment schools, and schools 
selected later in Phase 3 as control schools, focusing on the difference in outcomes 
for the one school year when Phase 1 treatment school had already been converted 
and Phase 3 control schools were not yet. Both treatment and control schools were 
selected into the programme according to the same criteria. 
 
We estimate the following standard difference-in-difference equation in which T is a 
binary indicator for treatment status, ‘Post’ is a binary indicator for pre or post 
status, 𝜸𝒊 are school fixed effects, δt are year fixed effects, and our main coefficient 
of interest is 𝜷𝟑 looking at the effect of the interaction between treatment and post. 
The key identifying assumption is that trends in the outcome would be the same in 
our treatment and control schools in the absence of the treatment. We can test 
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these common trends assumption using data on pre-assignment trends in school 
enrolment, to determine if they were parallel.  
 
yit=α+β1Tit+β2Postit+β3TitPostit+γi+δt+εit	
 
Enrolment Data 
 
We use data on enrolment from three sources; the Government Annual School 
Census, monthly monitoring data, and data collected from ASER.  
 
The primary source is the annual Government of Punjab School Census data (also 
known as Education Management Information System (EMIS) data).  This is reported 
by all headteachers in October each year4, and includes information on student 
enrolment by grade, facilities, staffing, and location. The main weakness of the EMIS 
data for our purpose is that the outcome variable of interest (enrolment) is self-
reported by schools. We address this by cross-checking the data against other 
sources. We compile EMIS data for all schools from 2012-13 to 2017-18.  
 
Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants (MEAs) from the Programme Monitoring and 
Implementation Unit (PMIU) of the School Education Department visit schools each 
month and directly observe student enrolment, teacher presence, and the 
availability of utilities. A team of 856 monitors covers 47,725 government schools 
(on average 56 schools each). Data is entered using a tablet-based mobile app, 																																																								
4 For 2017 we use enrolment data from monthly independent monitors collected from schools. 
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allowing for built-in validation checks. The correlation between enrolment reported 
by headteachers through the EMIS and reported by the independent monitors is 0.8.  
 
The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) is a citizen-led survey of students and 
schools. The survey covers over 250,000 children each year, tested at their home 
rather than at school in order to capture those not enrolled. The survey also gathers 
basic data about the government and private schools that are available to children, 
including school enrolment. The survey is conducted between September and 
November each year. The ASER dataset is limited to a sample of 734 schools in 
Punjab, of which fewer than 20 are PSSP schools. However the dataset does allow 
for the comparison of figures for the 734 Punjab schools in both datasets. There is a 
high correlation (0.94) between the number of teachers reported in the EMIS and 
ASER datasets. 
 
Learning Data 
 
For learning we use three different sources of data, from the Punjab Examinations 
Commission (PEC), the PMIU Learning and Numeracy Drive (LND), and the Punjab 
Education Foundation (PEF) Quality Assurance Tests (QAT).   
 
The primary source is the Punjab Examinations Commission (PEC) data. All students 
in both government and private schools are tested at Grade 5 and Grade 8 if they 
want to progress to the next level of schooling. These exams are high stakes for the 
student but not for the school. Exams are sat in February each year. Students must 
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be at least 8 years old to sit the Grade 5 exam. The Grade 5 exam is 1 hour long, with 
a total of 34 items (questions), of which 30 are multiple-choice focused on 
knowledge and 4 are open ended focused on comprehension. PEC reports average 
percentage marks (from 1 – 100) for exam candidates from each school in five 
subjects; Urdu, Maths, English, Science, and Islam. We standardize test scores by 
subject and year. 
 
Second, we also use Learning and Numeracy Drive (LND) collected on a monthly 
basis for a sample of Grade 2 and 3 students by PMIU staff.  
 
Third, PEF collects test data from all of the (mostly private) schools under its 
jurisdiction, as part of its accountability framework. At the primary school level tests 
are conducted in two randomly selected classrooms. Students sit a two hour exam 
covering four subjects; English, Urdu, Science, and Mathematics. Schools which fail 
two consecutive QATs lose their entitlement to public funds. For a school to pass, at 
least half of students must get at least 40 percent of the available marks on the test. 
In our data, we have the average pass mark for all students at each school. The 
majority of schools in the PSSP first phase were managed by non-governmental 
organisations. Of these schools, 43 percent passed the QAT (Table 4). Schools are 
provided with model papers and past exam papers to enable them to prepare 
students for the exams.  
 
		 16 
Table 4: QAT Pass Results for Phase 1 NGO Schools 
 
Schools 
Percentage 
of schools 
passing 
All Phase 1 NGO Schools 626  0.43  
Ghazali Education Trust 30  0.90  
Learning Zone 10  0.80  
National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) 100  0.60  
Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA) 30  0.53  
Akhuwat 100  0.41  
Punjab Rural Support Programme (PRSP) 70  0.41  
CARE Foundation 100  0.40  
The Citizens Foundation (TCF) 80  0.36  
Ghazali Society 45  0.24  
Developments in Literacy (DIL) 31  0.19  
Muslim Hands 30  0.13  
 
Phase 1 (Treatment) schools began operation at the start of the school year in April 
2016. The primary outcome data we use comes from the following year EMIS 
collected in October 2016 (6 months after conversion) and PEC exams from February 
2017 (10 months after conversion). Phase 3 (Control) schools then began operations 
at the start of the school year in April 2017. We discard data on Phase 2 schools that 
began 4 months into the school year and therefore may have faced considerable 
disruption.  
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Table 5: Data and Programme Timing 
Month PSSP Programme 
Enrolment Data Learning Data 
EMIS MEA ASER PEC LND QAT 
Oct-15   2015-16  Y    
Nov     Y    
Dec         
Jan-16         
Feb      G5   
Mar         
Apr Phase 1 (Treatment) Starts       
May         
Jun         
Jul         
Aug        
Sep     Y    
Oct   2016-17  Y    
Nov     Y    
Dec         
Jan-17    Y   G2-3  
Feb    Y  G5 G2-3  
Mar    Y   G2-3 P1 Endline 
Apr Phase 3 (Control) Starts  Y   G2-3 P3 Baseline 
May   Y   G2-3  
Jun        
Jul        
Aug   Y   G2-3  
Sep   Y Y  G2-3  
 
 
Although our identification does not rest on baseline balance in covariates between 
schools, we nonetheless present baseline descriptive statistics between the groups 
of schools. The differences between the treatment and control schools are 
statistically significant but small, across prior enrolment, years of operation, number 
of classrooms and classes, and statistically insignificant between the number of 
books. PSSP schools (both treatment and control) are however clearly different to 
the average school across the whole state. PSSP schools are almost all primary 
schools, compared to 67% of all Punjab schools, and PSSP schools are much smaller 
on average. 
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Table 6: Baseline Balance  
 
Treatment 
(Phase 1) 
Control 
(Phase 3) 
Non PSSP 
Schools 
Diff (Phase 
1 – Phase 
3) 
P – Value 
N (Schools) 995 1,977 49,189   
Years of operation 37 35 45 2 0.000 
Classrooms 2.8 2.5 5.4 0.3 0.000 
Classes 5.9 5.6 7.0 0.3 0.000 
Primary 0.99 0.98 0.67 0.01 0.002 
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4. Results 
 
Our empirical strategy rests on the assumption that Phase 3 schools can serve as a 
valid control group for Phase 1 schools. We do not need schools to have the same 
level of prior enrolment, but the same trends. In the following analysis I first focus 
on enrolment as an outcome before moving to learning outcomes. For each, I first 
inspect graphs of the average outcomes over time for treatment and control schools, 
second present a descriptive analysis showing average outcomes pre- and post- 
reform, and finally present the same analysis in an OLS regression framework 
including controls for school and time fixed effects.  
 
Enrolment 
 
We can observe a parallel trend in enrolment for treatment and control schools 
between 2012 and 2015, with a break between 2015-16 and 2016-17 when 
treatment schools are treated and their enrolment rises. In the 2017-18 school year 
enrolment continues to rise in treatment schools, control schools are treated, and 
enrolment in control schools begins to increases in parallel with treatment schools.  
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Figure 4: Enrolment trends in treatment & control schools 
  
The left panel presents trends in average student enrolment numbers for treatment (Phase 1) schools 
and control (Phase 3) schools. The right panel presents estimated treatment effects by year. Data for 
2012-2016 is self-reported by headteachers in annual school census carried out in October. Data for 
2017 is collected by independent monitors from the school register in August. 
 
We next present mean enrolment level for the years immediately pre- and post- 
treatment, demonstrating that the difference in change in means across treatment 
and control is statistically significant. Enrolment in treatment schools increased by 
58 students (60 percent) more than in control schools (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Difference-in-Difference Table for Enrolment   
Phase 
Mean 
Enrolment 
2015-16 
Mean 
Enrolment 
2016-17 
Difference 
P - 
Value 
Schools 
Control (Phase 3) 68 72 4  1,945 
Treatment (Phase 1) 77 139 62  938 
Difference 9 67 58 0.00  
 
 
We then estimate the effect of treatment in a regression framework, including all 
previous years of data and including year fixed effects (column 1), school controls 
(column 2), and school fixed effects (column 3). The coefficient is stable at 48 to 49 
students across specifications (Table 8). 
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Table 8: OLS Estimate on Enrolment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment x Post 48.607*** 48.611*** 48.366*** 
 (1.488) (1.499) (1.484) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
School Controls  Yes  
School FE   Yes 
    
Baseline Control Mean 76.6 76.6 76.6 
N 17,099 16,701 17,099 
N (Schools) 2,884 2,794 2,884 
R-squared 0.207 0.313 0.335 
Dependent variable is number of students enrolled. School controls include prior number of years in 
operation, number of classrooms and classes, and district fixed effects. Coefficients on the treatment 
and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Breaking down this change in enrolment by grade, we observe that the increase is 
concentrated in Katchi (Kindergarten) (40 students) and the early grades. The 
difference in Grade 5 is just 1 additional student in treatment over control schools.5  
 
Table 9: OLS Estimate on Enrolment by Grade     
 K 1-5 1 2 3 4 5 
        
Treatment x 
Post 
39.928**
* 
18.488*** 6.961*** 3.923*** 3.956*** 1.857*** 1.027*** 
 (1.254) (1.022) (0.439) (0.311) (0.259) (0.225) (0.203) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Baseline 
Control Mean 
26.4 40.9 12.3 9.8 7.4 6.5 4.9 
N 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 5,588 
N (Schools) 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 2,794 
R-squared 0.505 0.290 0.207 0.174 0.167 0.069 0.044 
The outcome variable in each regression is the number of students in that grade. Coefficients on the 
treatment and post dummies are omitted.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 																																																								
5 We do not have data on student attendance, but unpublished analysis by McKinsey of MEA data 
suggests a slight decrease in the student attendance rate of Phase 1 schools after conversion. 
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Enrolment Spillovers 
 
Were newly enrolled children previously out of school, or enrolled elsewhere? 
Whilst we find a strong effect of treatment on enrolment at PSSP schools, an 
important policy question is whether total enrolment increased – whether PSSP 
schools attract students who would not otherwise have attended school at all, or 
whether they attract students from other schools. The data presented so far on 
enrolment at the individual school level does not allow us to determine whether 
these newly enrolled students were previously out of school altogether or enrolled 
in a different school. That most of the new enrolment is in Katchi rather than higher 
grades may be suggestive that at least some of this enrolment was from previously 
out of school children. However, we should also note that schools may also have 
more actively recruited younger children, as schools are subject to high-stakes (for 
the school) QAT tests for students in grades two to five, with penalties attached for 
poor performance, making the recruitment of older students riskier. 
 
We perform one other test; looking at enrolment of the closest neighbouring school 
of our treatment and control schools, which should capture any spillover from other 
public schools (we do not have data on enrolment in private schools). 
 
We first link schools geographically to their nearest neighbouring public school. We 
estimate the same difference-in-difference model as in the previous section, but in 
this case using the treatment status of the closest neighbouring public school rather 
than of the school itself. Results suggest that schools whose closest neighboring 
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public schools is a PSSP treatment school see increases in enrolment compared with 
those whose closest neighbor is a PSSP control school. This increase is again focused 
in Katchi. This is the opposite of the negative effect that we would expect if 
enrolment in treatment schools were driven by the movement of students from 
neighbouring schools. 
 
Table 10: OLS Estimate on enrolment of neighbouring a PSSP school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All All K All Primary 
Neighbour Treated X Post -0.790 11.504*** 14.337*** 1.649 
 (7.878) (3.903) (3.368) (2.125) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
School FE  Yes   
     
Baseline Control Mean 124.2 124.2 26.4 40.9 
N 8,956 8,956 824 824 
N (Schools) 2,589 2,589 414 414 
R-squared 0.015 0.119 0.234 0.132 
Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Robustness 
 
In studies with a large number of time periods, serial correlation in both the 
outcome and the independent variable of interest may be a concern, biasing our 
standard errors. Following (Bertrand et al., 2004) we address this concern by 
collapsing the data into a single pre- and post- reform period, finding qualitatively 
similar results.  
		 24 
Mechanisms 
 
How do schools increase student enrolment? The main data we have on potential 
mechanisms is on teacher numbers, finding large increases in the number of 
teachers in treatment schools. We first estimate the effect of school conversion on 
the number of teachers at the school, finding an increase of 3 teachers per school. 
Though we do not have data on teacher salaries paid in these schools, we know from 
other studies that teacher salaries are substantially lower in private schools than in 
government schools in Punjab. One estimate put average monthly salaries in private 
schools at 1,407 rupees ($12), and in government schools at 7,671 rupees ($66) (Bau 
and Das, 2017). 
 
Table 11: OLS estimate on Number of Teachers at School 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment x Post 3.068*** 3.062*** 3.087*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
School FE   Yes 
    
Baseline Control Mean 2.1 2.1 2.1 
N 5,679 5,504 5,679 
N (Schools) 2,880 2,791 2,880 
R-squared 0.478 0.534 0.551 
Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
This increase in the number of teachers in treatment schools translates into an 
overall reduction in class sizes of 9 pupils per teacher, compared to control schools. 
Analysis of MEA data by McKinsey found no change in teacher presence rates for 
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PSSP Phase 1 and 2 schools after conversion, and no change in school facilities 
(boundary walls, toilets, electricity, drinking water).  
 
Table 12: OLS estimate on class size (Pupil-Teacher Ratio) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment x Post -9.323*** -8.816*** -9.324*** 
 (1.052) (1.066) (1.063) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
School FE   Yes 
    
Baseline Control Mean 34.5 34.5 34.5 
N 5,664 5,491 5,664 
N (Schools) 2,879 2,791 2,879 
R-squared 0.013 0.135 0.038 
Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    
 
Student performance 
 
How do these schools perform in terms of learning? We estimate the same 
difference-in-difference model as used previously, using the province-wide 
standardized Grade 5 exam test score data as the outcome. We first look at the 
number of students taking the exam. The average number of students taking the 
exam in treatment schools increased from 5.8 in 2015-16 to 7.9 in 2016-17, an 
increase of two students. The difference-in-difference estimate falls from 2 to 1.5 
students when controlling for school fixed effects (columns 1 and 3, Table 13). 
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Table 13: OLS estimate on Number of Grade 5 Exam Candidates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment x Post 1.960*** 1.717*** 1.513*** 
 (0.195) (0.196) (0.193) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
School Controls  Yes  
School FE   Yes 
    
Baseline Control Mean 5.5 5.5 5.5 
N 7,592 7,472 7,592 
N (Schools) 2,780 2,726 2,780 
R-squared 0.023 0.214 0.071 
School controls include prior number of years in operation, number of classrooms and classes, and 
district fixed effects. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
This increase in the number of students taking the Grade 5 exam makes it difficult to 
interpret the effect on average test scores, as we are unable to distinguish between 
a treatment effect on pre-enrolled students and a compositional effect via the entry 
of new candidates. We might expect the increase in new exam takers to come from 
marginal students with lower than average expected results. There are effectively 10 
months of treatment between the start of school and the end of term exam.  
 
The graph of mean exam scores shows a slight decline for treatment schools relative 
to control schools after treatment, but also that trends from the prior three years 
are not parallel, and there is a negative difference in test scores for treatment 
schools the year prior to their treatment. 
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Figure 5: Trends in Grade 5 Scores for treatment & control schools 
  
The left panel presents trends in average student exam scores for treatment (Phase 1) schools and 
control (Phase 3 schools). The right panel shows estimated treatment effects by year. All data is at the 
school-level from the Punjab Examinations Commission. 
 
In the OLS regression framework we estimate a small negative difference in overall 
average test scores (-0.08 school-level standard deviations) and on Maths and 
English, (-0.1 school-level standard deviations), but no change in Urdu, Science, or 
Islam scores.6  
 
Table 14: OLS estimate on Grade 5 Test Scores, by Subject 
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post -0.082** -0.027 -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.032 -0.046 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) (0.034) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Baseline Control Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N 9,758 9,758 9,758 9,758 9,758 9,758 																																																								
6 Note that the interpretation of effect sizes in terms of school average test score standard deviations 
is different to the interpretation of effect sizes in terms of individual student standard deviations. The 
variation in school average test scores is roughly half of the variation in student test scores, so to 
compare this effect size with estimates from impact evaluations using individual student data, one 
should divide this estimate by half. 
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N (Schools) 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,749 
R-squared 0.328 0.095 0.409 0.231 0.278 0.174 
The dependent variable is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation of one by year and 
subject. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
         
 
Ideally, we would address the conflation of treatment and compositional effects by 
limiting our analysis to students who would have taken the test without treatment, 
but with our data we are unable to identify these students. What we can identify is 
the change in the total number of candidates entered by the school. We estimate 
heterogenous effects by splitting the sample into schools that had an increase in the 
number of candidates, schools that had the same number as the previous year, and 
schools that had fewer candidates. Here we see a difference - schools that did not 
increase the number of candidates after treatment saw no statistically significant 
change in overall scores or most subjects. Only schools that increased the number of 
candidates saw a drop in their overall average test score, suggesting that the overall 
drop in test scores may be driven in part by a compositional effect, with treatment 
schools on average entering a greater number of weaker candidates.  
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Table 15: OLS estimate on Grade 5 Test Scores, by School Type 
Panel A: Schools with fewer candidates after treatment 
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post 0.018 0.080 -0.035 -0.060 0.131* -0.025 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.066) (0.074) (0.075) (0.068) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 
N (Schools) 895 895 895 895 895 895 
R-squared 0.314 0.095 0.410 0.210 0.262 0.169 
Panel B: Schools with the same number of candidates after treatment 
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post -0.002 0.060 -0.060 0.042 -0.035 -0.004 
 (0.092) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.113) (0.086) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1,401 1,401 1,401 1,401 1,401 1,401 
N (Schools) 425 425 425 425 425 425 
R-squared 0.378 0.129 0.450 0.263 0.295 0.219 
Panel C: Schools with more candidates after treatment     
 All Urdu Maths Eng Sci Isl 
Treatment x Post -0.158*** -0.107** -0.154*** -0.163*** -0.130** -0.064 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053) (0.043) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 
N (Schools) 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 
R-squared 0.327 0.090 0.401 0.239 0.287 0.168 
The dependent variable is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation of one by year and 
subject. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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We can also use the monthly Literacy and Numeracy Drive (LND) data for 2017 to 
look at the change in performance for Phase 3 schools following their conversion. 
Here we don’t have the same natural control group, but can show a comparison with 
Phase 1 schools, and with other schools. Here there is a substantial fall in test scores 
following conversion, but again we are again unable to precisely distinguish between 
the treatment effect on pre-existing students and the compositional effect of the 
enrolment of new students. What appears to be a steeper decline in grade 2-3 test 
scores than grade 5 test scores is consistent with a purely compositional effect – 
enrolment increased by 4 students in grades 2 and 3, and by just 1 in grade 5. The 
speed of the drop in test scores (in a single month) may also be more consistent with 
a compositional effect than a treatment effect.  
 
Figure 6: Trends in Grade 2-3 Test Scores (2017) 
  
This figure presents trends in average student test scores for PSSP and all schools. Phase 1 schools 
were converted in the prior year, and Phase 3 schools in April.  
 
Phase 3
schools
treated
.6
.6
5
.7
.7
5
.8
.8
5
%
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
Co
rre
ct
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Aug Sep
PSSP Phase 1 PSSP Phase 3
All other schools
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
month
Effect Confidence Interval
		 31 
The visual inspection of the figure is supported by the simple difference in mean test 
scores (Table 16) and the OLS estimate with subject, grade, and school fixed effects 
(Table 17), which is -0.11 percentage points lower test scores.  
 
Table 16: Difference-in-difference table for Grade 2-3 Test Scores 
 Jan-Mar 2017 Apr-Sep 2017 Difference 
Phase 1 0.74 0.67 -0.07 
Phase 3 0.81 0.63 -0.18 
Other 0.83 0.78 -0.05 
Phase 3 - Phase 1 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 
 
Table 17: OLS estimate on Grade 2-3 Test Scores 
 (1) (2) 
   
Treatment x Post -0.107*** -0.112*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Subject FE Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes 
Student Controls Yes Yes 
School FE  Yes 
   
N 70,967 70,967 
N (Schools) 2,801 2,801 
R-squared 0.103 0.102 
The dependent variable is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation of one by year and 
subject. Coefficients on the treatment and post dummies are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
    
 
In contrast to the findings so far, results from the Quality Assurance Tests (which are 
high stakes for schools) do suggest improvement in treatment schools. We only have 
tests from a single point in time, but can compare results for phase 1 schools at the 
end of their first year with phase 3 schools at the start of their first year. In these 
tests the average pass mark in treatment schools was 55 percent, compared with 41 
percent in control schools. 425 treatment PSSP schools (43 percent) failed the QAT 
test at the end of their first year.  
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Figure 7: Quality Assurance Tests (QAT) (2017) 
 
 
Bounds on the compositional effect 
 
Arithmetically, we can estimate a bound on the size of any possible negative 
compositional bias. Our test score data comes from Grades 2, 3, and 5. Although the 
increase in enrolment was concentrated in Katchi, there was a small increase in 
enrolment in these grades as well, which as numbers were low to begin with means 
that 23 to 31 percent of students taking tests after the reform were new students. If 
we assume that the true treatment effect on the original students was zero, we can 
calculate how much worse the performance must have been amongst the new 
students for the overall estimated average effect to be the size that it was. This 
calculation is laid out in Table 18 below, and the implied performance of new 
students ranges from -0.35 standard deviations worse in Grade 5 to -0.45 in Grade 2.  
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Table 18: Minimum required bias from compositional effect consistent with a null 
treatment effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Increase in 
candidates 
Total new
candidates
New Students 
as % of Total 
Students 
Overall test
score reduction 
(SD) 
Minimum required 
negative effect of 
new students (SD) 
Grade 5 1.5 6.5 0.23 -0.08 -0.35
Grade 3 4 13 0.31 -0.112 -0.36
Grade 2 4 16 0.25 -0.112 -0.45
Column 4 shows the observed reduction in test scores for each grade. Column 5 assumes that the 
treatment effect was in fact zero for existing students, and calculates what the required negative 
‘effect’ of the new students would have to be if they were alone responsible for the overall reduction 
observed in column 4.  
There could also have been selection in the other direction – some new students 
may have come from private schools, and be more advantaged than the average 
student. We aren’t able to place a bound on this possible positive selection.  
Are the Results Externally Valid? 
Whether these results are relevant for schools outside of our sample depends upon 
a) whether conditions are similar elsewhere, b) whether we have identified a
generalizable behavioural mechanism, and c) whether implementation can be 
replicated elsewhere (Bates and Glennerster, 2017). We begin by noting that our 
sample and treatment estimate already includes all schools in the first phase of the 
PSSP, suggesting that our results are at least valid for all schools in this programme.  
Would our results replicate if the PSSP was scaled up to other schools in the Punjab? 
As the programme was targeted explicitly at “failing” schools with low enrolment or 
exam scores, we can’t with confidence assume that similar results would be found in 
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other schools in the Punjab. In the UK, contracting out the management of 
government schools (through the academy programme) was most successful in its 
first stage, when particularly weak government schools were targeted for 
academisation. The more recent opening of the programme to more successful 
schools seems to have been less effective (Eyles et al., 2017) (Eyles et al., 2016). A 
similar interpretation can be applied to results found in evaluations of US charter 
schools – where charter schools appear to be most effective in urban areas then 
they are being compared to particularly low-quality traditional public schools 
(Angrist et al., 2013) (Clark et al., 2015). In non-urban areas, where traditional public 
schools are better, the estimated effects of charter schools on learning are negative 
or null. 
 
Second, is there a generalizable behavioural mechanism at play here? The underlying 
principle behind PSSP is the provision of autonomy to schools on operations, with 
discretion over hiring and spending received on a per student basis, and 
accountability on outcomes (test-scores). There is evidence from public schools that 
the provision of grants on a per student basis can incentivize schools to increase 
their enrolment (Blimpo et al., 2015) (Carneiro et al., 2015) (Reinikka and Svensson, 
2011). In this sense, the financing of non-state school operators is just an 
intensification of common financing relationships with government schools. The 
addition of new test-based accountability for schools does not seem to have 
improved learning outcomes, at least in the short term, consistent with mixed 
findings on the value of test-based accountability systems in the US (Holbein and 
Ladd, 2017) (Figlio and Loeb, 2011).  
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Implications for government finances and access to education in Pakistan 
Converting schools to private management through the PSSP reduces per pupil 
spending by government in those schools from an average of 1,507 rupees to 550 
rupees. For 400,000 students this is a saving of 382 million rupees ($3.6m USD), or 
around 0.14 percent of the total Punjab provincial budget for education of 296 
billion rupees ($2.5bn USD). This is therefore a small overall saving, and furthermore 
is counteracted by the increased expenditure elsewhere. When schools are 
converted to PSSP, the existing teachers are moved to other schools rather than laid 
off altogether, with PSSP schools then being permitted to hire their own new 
teachers at lower pay scales. An important question therefore is how effectively the 
original PSSP school teachers are used in other schools, and whether they fill teacher 
gaps elsewhere or duplicate existing effort.  
We are unable to estimate how much of the increase in enrolment comes from 
children who were previously out of school. If we take the increase in Katchi alone as 
an estimate of the increase in new enrolment into PSSP schools, this amounts to an 
additional 40 students enrolled per school for over 4,000 schools, or over 170,000 in 
total. The cost of this increase is thus around 93.5 million rupees ($0.9m USD).  
The province of Punjab has around 2.5 million children aged 5-9 who have never 
been enrolled in school. Enrolling all these in government schools at current 
spending levels would cost 3.8 billion rupees ($35m USD) per year, compared to 1.4 
billion rupees ($13m USD) in Punjab Education Foundation-supported schools. This 
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potential saving ($22m USD) is still small relative to total annual provincial spending 
on education ($2.5bn USD).  
 
Thus, though the policy is large for its kind, it remains small in the context of primary 
schooling in Punjab. For the policy to make a substantial contribution to improved 
primary education it will need to continue to grow both in pupils per school and in 
the number of schools in the programme. For the policy to be expanded further 
though careful continued attention is warranted to the quality of these schools.  
 
An important further caveat is whether the payment of market salaries in PSSP 
schools is sustainable, or whether teachers at PSSP schools may be able to lobby to 
receive regular government teacher salaries. Policies of hiring teaching assistants in 
government schools on temporary contracts and at market wages in Kenya 
(Sandefur, 2013) and India7 have eventually failed after unions were successfully 
able to lobby for contract teachers to be regularized and put on permanent civil 
service payrolls with union wage levels. 
																																																								
7 https://scroll.in/article/846589/in-uttar-pradeshs-botched-effort-at-regularising-contract-teachers-
a-lesson-for-other-states 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have estimated the effect of the fastest ever programme of 
contracting out government schools to private management. We find a large 
increase in enrolment and a modest decline in test scores. We are unable to say with 
full confidence how much of the increase in enrolment came from students who 
were not already in another school, or whether the observed decline in test scores is 
due to a negative treatment effect or a purely compositional effect.  
 
We are also unable to determine whether the effect on school enrolment is inherent 
to private management, or simply a function of a system of school financing in which 
schools are reimbursed on a per student basis.  
 
Any further expansion of the programme should include some attention to 
identifying and tracking students who were enrolled in schools before transition, in 
order to estimate the actual treatment effect on learning outcomes. Using 
randomization for the selection of any additional schools could also allow for clearer 
causal identification of effects on enrolment and learning. 
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